Children\u27s and adults\u27 ability to generalize properties to novel objects :: implications for theories of categorization. by Asplin, Kristen N.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1998
Children's and adults' ability to generalize
properties to novel objects :: implications for
theories of categorization.
Kristen N. Asplin
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Asplin, Kristen N., "Children's and adults' ability to generalize properties to novel objects :: implications for theories of categorization."
(1998). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 2327.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/2327

CHILDREN'S AND ADULTS' ABILITY TO GENERALIZE PROPERTIES TO




Submitted to the Graduate School of theUniversity of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment




© Copyright by Kristen N. Asplin 1998
All Rights Reserved
CHILDREN'S AND ADULTS' ABILITY TO GENERALIZE PROPERTIES TO




Approved as to style and content by:
Charles E. Clifton, Chair
Gary F. Marcus, Member
Marvin W. Daehler, Member
Melinda Novak, Department Head
Department of Psychology
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would lite to thank Gary Marcus for his continued help
despite his move to New York. I would especially like to
thank my entire cozmnittee for their advice and comments on
revising this manuscript. Finally, i would like to thank my




CHILDREN'S AND ADULTS' ABILITY TO GENERALIZE PROPERTIES TO
NOVEL OBJECTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF CATEGORIZATION
SEPTEMBER 1998
KRISTEN N. ASPLIN, B. A., GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS COLLEGE
M. S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Charles E. Clifton
This study investigated people's ability to draw
inferences from known objects to new kinds of objects. An
illustrative example is the ability to generalize a rule,
such as a member of species X will have offspring of species
X, to a newly discovered species Y. This ability remains
unexplained by certain connectionist models and models of
categorization other than the Theory Theory.
This thesis utilized a method from Keil (1989), where
objects were transformed to appear like other objects.
Fifteen, seven- and ten-year-olds and adults each, were told
stories of surgeons who transformed natural kinds objects to
look like other natural objects (e.g. raccoon to skunk),
artifacts to look like different artifacts (e.g. umbrella to
flag) and novel natural objects to look like familiar natural
objects (e.g. hoatzin - a bird that climbs trees with its
wings - to goose)
.
V
Younger children usually stated that all objects had
Changed and that offspring would loo. llKe the transformed
Object. Ten-year-olds and adults, however, often responded
that natural kinds had not changed and would have offspring
ixke their original appearance. More importantly, no
differences between responses to novel and familiar natural
scenarios were found. All participants who judged that a
Plant or animal would have babies like the original object
made this judgment for both novel and familiar scenarios.
TO more fully examine the participants responses, their
explanations of their answers were categorized into three
types Of reasoning: perceptual, functional /behavioral, and
biological. AS expected, perceptual reasoning decreased in
frequency with age, and biological increased with age on the
natural scenarios
. Functional reasoning increased on the
artifact scenarios. Examining the justifications explored an
unexpected pattern of responses, where participants believed
the object to have changed, but the offspring would appear
like the original object.
In this experiment participants treated the novel and
familiar scenarios equally. This result provides
exceptionally clear evidence that children's and adults'
theories of natural kinds must include a rule or variable-
manipulating system, and they can generalize that rule to
novel natural kinds. Therefore, a rule or variable-
VI
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The last decade has seen a new direction in the
development of models of categorization. Previous models
relied on features or properties of objects to categorize the
world (Smith . Medin, 1981; Rosch, 1978,. The newer Theory
Theory builds on previous models by adding a second level of
explanation. Proponents of the Theory Theory (e.g. Gopnik «,
Meltzoff, 1997) postulate that, besides using features to
categorize an object, a person has a naive theory, or
concept. Of why an object belongs in a category, while this
new hypothesis can account for many previously unexplained
facts, as will be described below, there are still more facts
waiting to be explained. One phenomenon that remains
unexplained is people's ability to generalize information
from previous knowledge to new kinds of objects. People can
generalize known properties to a new object when they assign
it to a known category. For example, imagine you are seeing
your first tiger, but you have already seen small cats,
lions, and leopards before, you can infer that, as a feline,
the tiger could be a carnivore and would therefore be
dangerous
. This thesis attempts to show that models of
categorization must include a mechanism for this type of
generalization or inference. Marcus (in press) proposes that
a rule system or an algebraic, variable-manipulating system
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can provide that mechanise, and this ^echaniSM can best
account for the data that are presented here.
Early Models of ratoq^,-^ lon
The Classical view of categorization defines concepts in
terms of a list of necessary and sufficient conditions (see
smith . Medin, 1981 for a review). Such a list of conditions
would amount to a definition resembling those found in a
dictionary. For example, we might define an odd nuirDer as
the set Of numbers that give a remainder of one when divided
by two, or we might define a chair as something with four
legs, an upright back support, and a flat space parallel to
the ground that can support a human in a seated position.
This model is inadequate, however, since researchers
have been unable to enumerate the list of necessary and
sufficient conditions for most concepts, instead, for most
categories, there are exceptions for nearly every feature
that has been proposed. To continue with the chair
illustration from above, there are three-legged chairs, back-
less chairs, and bean bag chairs which do not seem to have
any features in common with other chairs. Even if we exclude
bean bags as aberrant chairs, we might only retain the
feature "space that can support a seated human." This
reduction of features to only that which is necessary
produces the opposite problem: the remaining feature is not
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sufficient to select only the objects in the world that are
Chairs. Not everything that can acconunodate a seated person
xs a Chair (e.g. table, desk, etc.). caught between being
too general and too specific, researchers have been unable to
identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for all but
a few concepts (Smith & Medin, 1981). These concepts
include, notably, mathematical terms like "odd nuu^er" where
the necessary and sufficient condition is "a number that,
when divided by two, gives a remainder of one."
This inadequate model of categorization was replaced in
the 1970 's with a class of models that use features in more
flexible ways to define a category. The family resemblance,
prototype and similarity models, postulated by Rosch and
other researchers, no longer use static lists of necessary
and sufficient conditions. For these models, a category is a
similarity space whose dimensions are features. This
category space has a center which is sometimes called a
prototype (e.g. Rosch, 1978). m the prototype theory, the
prototype is the ideal instantiation of the concept. By
using a comparison function, an individual exemplar is
measured against the prototype or feature dimensions of the
category. Unlike the all-or-none list of features in the
classic view of categorization, this type of comparison
allows for grading of exemplars. An exemplar can be a better
or worse member of a category (e.g. a dining room chair vs. a
bean-bag chair), based on its similarity to the ideal
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exemplar or category center. These models can also account
for fuzzy boundaries for a concept, as they allow the
similarity function to determine whether an object is a
member of one of two similar categories, if an exemplar is
somewhat similar to the prototypes for two categories, but
not a good exemplar of one (e.g. is a tomato a fruit or a
vegetable,, the boundary between the two categories may be
unclear.
Problems with Feature-Based Mnri^ig
These similarity models still rely on features to
categorize objects, and therefore cannot explain certain
observations in categorization. Murphy and Medin (1985) and
Keil (1994), among others, have argued that although feature-
based models can explain much of the way our minds categorize
the world, another level of explanation is also necessary.
Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1983) tested whether
all categories could fit into either the classical view of
categorization or into the family resemblance view.
According to the classical view, categories are strictly
defined by necessary and sufficient features; they have no
graded membership or internal structure. An exemplar is
either a member of the category or it is not, and there is no
mechanism to compare members within the category, in the
family resemblance or similarity models, categories have
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graded structure and graded ™e,^ership based on similarity to
a prototype, or other feature dimensions, with these two
types Of models as options for the structure of categories,
categories either have both graded structure within a
category and graded membership between categories, or they do
not,
To test if all categories had graded structure, the
researchers first gave participants a list of items from the
categories of odd numbers and fruit (among other category
lists) and asked them to rate the "goodness of fit" of each
of the examples to the category label on a seven point scale.
A "very good" example of an odd number was rated a 1, and a
"very poor" example of an odd number would be rated a 7. The
researchers found that the number "3" received an average
rating of 1.6, and the number "447" a rating of 3.7. Similar
differences in the ratings for fruit were also obtained. A
cherry was rated 1.7 and a coconut was rated 4.8. it seemed
that both categories did have graded structure within the
category. To test if both categories had graded membership
participants were asked whether it made sense to ask someone
about the degree of membership that 447 had as an odd number,
and coconut had as a fruit. All of the participants said
that it did not make sense to ask this question for the odd
numbers, but 57 percent said it did make sense for the fruit.
The participants seemed to agree that all odd numbers are odd
numbers, whether or not they are "good" odd numbers. In
5
contrast, judging the graded meiri^ership of the category of
fruit seemed to make sense to the subjects.
Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman had found that while
the category of odd number had graded structure within the
category (as in a family resemblance model of a category) it
was still rigidly defined by a set of features, as in the
classical view of categorization. The similarity class of
models, like those of Rosch and her colleagues, could not
predict that graded membership and graded structure were
separable. Therefore, some other mechanism or level of
explanation must exist, which can decide between all-or-none
vs. graded membership types of categories.
Another phenomenon for which the early models of
categorization have yet to account is the differences
existing between broad classes of knowledge. Previous models
categories (e.g. Rosch, 1978) have shown that there are
hierarchies for where more specific categories are contained
within larger, more general categories. The large, general
categories are called superordinate categories, and include
things like "furniture" or "animals." One of the most
significant superordinate distinctions that has been
investigated is the separation of natural kinds from
artifacts. Natural kinds are a class of objects (e.g.
animals, vegetables and minerals) that occur in the
environment without human intervention (Putnam, 1975).
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Artifacts, which are produced by humans, make up another
large class. How the two classes differ can be seen in how
they are treated by science^ (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). we
observe, discover, and constantly redefine the division of
the natural kind objects. Large branches of science, such as
botany, are devoted to discovering more about natural kinds,
in contrast, there is no division of science that is devoted
to discovering more about trash cans and how they differ from
mailboxes. We humans, as creators of these artifacts, have
defined the categories by their function.
Medin and Shoben (1988) have shown that transforming
objects can point out one of the fundamental differences
between artifacts and natural kinds, when participants are
presented with a banana and a boomerang that have been
straightened, the banana is still perceived as a banana but
the boomerang is seen as a stick. This example illustrates
that natural kinds (e.g. animals, plants, minerals) comprise
a domain where only deep, structural changes (genetic
engineering, nuclear fission, etc.) can change their
identity. Artifacts form another domain where appearance and
features match intended function. When the features are
' Occasionally there are intriguing exceptions within the class of
artifacts, for example: art, computers, cars and other complex
inventions (Keil 1991). These man-made objects seem to defy the simple,
functional descriptions that define most artifacts, and can have fields
of study associated with them. Despite this, all of the artifacts in
this study are simple (like the mailbox), so the simple division of
artifacts and natural kinds will suffice.
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changed so that the function is modified or lost, the
artifact has changed.
Keil (1989) used the procedure of transforming objects
to test if children and adults do indeed make the distinction
between these two categories, m his study, children from
five to ten years-old were given pictures of objects, both
natural (animal, vegetable and mineral) and artifacts, and
were then told a story about how those objects were changed
with plastic surgery. After seeing a picture of the
transformed object, the children were then asked, with a
somewhat informal interview, questions about the object.
Keil found that children of all ages believed the
artifacts to had changed. The natural kinds evoked a
different response pattern. Children in Kindergarten tended
to believe that the objects were changed, but fourth-grade
children stated that the animal remained the same, despite
the transformation. Keil interpreted his findings by
concluding that as children grow older, their understandings
of these transformations are less reliant on the
characteristic perceptual features and more reliant on their
more biological understandings of natural kinds.
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The Theory Theory
A new model of categorization was introduced to provide
a second of explanation that can help explain some of the
limitations of the early, feature-based models of
categorization. The Theory Theory, which began in the
philosophy of science literature (Morton, 1980), postulates
that people have a framework of intuitive theories for a
domain of knowledge, we can partially define these theories
as a "host of mental 'explanations' ... a complex set of
relations between concepts, usually with a causal basis"
(Murphy & Medin, 1985). in other words, a framework of
theories provides us with a broad basis for understanding a
domain of knowledge (e.g. biology), and helps us relate one
concept to another within that domain (Wellman, 1990). A
theory underlying a particular concept goes beyond the
exemplars, or features of the exemplars in that concept, and
provides the reason the concept contains those exemplars and
features. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, Murphy & Medin, 1985).
A theory does not, however, need to be explicit or even
available to the conscious mind. A theory most likely
operates on a sub-conscious level. The Theory Theory does
not refute the usefulness of models like the prototype or
family resemblance models but provides a second, more
abstract level to the explanation of our ability to
categorize the world we live in. According to the Theory
Theory view, both features (and/or exemplars) and the
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theoretical explanations for the category are needed at the
same time. Keil (1994) succinctly explains this need for two
levels of information. "Explanations do not amount to much
if they do not have anything to explain, and raw tabulations
quickly overwhelm any information gathering system if it does
not partially order that information in terms of explanatory
usefulness." Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) agree, comparing
categorization to scientific inquiry by saying we need both
the hypothesis and the data to fully understand a phenomenon.
How can the Theory Theory explain the facts found by
Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman? According to this view, a
person's intuitive theory about a category may contain an
explanation for why, within a domain such as mathematics,
categories can have rigid, non-graded membership. This
explanation might include the information that constructs,
such as odd number, are mathematical definitions that
absolutely constrain the set of possible exemplars, while
the theory is constraining the membership of the category,
our feature-calculations may still provide a graded
"goodness" judgment when forced.
The difference between natural kinds and artifacts,
illistrated through the transformations performed on them by
Keil (1989) can also be explained by the Theory Theory.
People's naive theories of natural kinds may contain an idea
of an "essence" in natural objects that remains the same
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despite superficial transformations (Gelman and Hirschfeld,
1997). This essence could tell us that the banana remains a
banana, even when straightened, since the theory behind the
identity of a boomerang, as an artifact, would have no such
essence associated with it, would allow for identity changes
by superficial transformations.
To briefly summarize, the Theory Theory has been able to
offer explanations for differences between categories. This
model, as opposed to the earlier models of categorization,
can explain why a category can either have fixed or graded
membership. The Theory Theory can also explain why objects
from artifact categories can be transformed by simply
changing the perceptual features, whereas natural kinds
remain unchanged by these transformations.
Conceptual Change
In his 1989 study, Keil not only found that transformed
artifacts and natural kinds are treated differently, but also
that people's intuitive theories about these transformations
are not the same at different ages. The present study did
not measure participants' responses longitudinally, so it
cannot directly measure how a theory behind a category or
concept might change over time. However, I will discuss here
how adults ' theories might have changed with maturity and
experience and therefore differ from those of children.
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concepts, and the theories behind them, must change as
we learn and age. Carey's (1985) work with the concept of
alive is an experimental example of a conceptual change.
Carey (1985) introduced participants to a novel property;
children were taught that people have spleens, and adults
were taught that people possessed an omentum (a membrane in
the abdomen). She then asked them if other things (dogs,
bees, worms, flowers, clouds, garlic presses) had spleens or
omentums. Children seemed to use the general properties of
animacy and similarity to humans to create their inferences.
That is, they inferred that all animate objects had a spleen,
but were less likely to make this inference as the object
became less similar to humans. The adults attributed an
omentum to an object much more often when the object was a
vertebrate than an invertebrate. They also seemed to
distinguish between plants and other inanimate objects.
Carey concluded that younger children understand life as
"animacy" and adults understand it as "living" with sub-
categories for plants, invertebrates, vertebrates and
mammals. These two frameworks (animacy and living) differ,
but both are used to make inference judgments of this new
property to known objects.
Keil (1989) and Carey (1989) both found that a theory
behind a concept was different at different ages. Carey's
studies found that while younger children's theory of alive
might have only included animate objects, the theory seems to
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develop with age and/or experience to include the plant
kingdom. The oldest children's theory of alive also
subdivides alive into sub-classes such as vertebrates and
invertebrates, it seems that there are several stages in
understanding the concept "alive." Keil's studies on
transformations showed that the understanding of essence goes
through several stages as well. He ran his transformations
experiment in two ways, with younger children (two to three
year-olds) the transformation story only said that the first
object was wearing a costume, and therefore looked like the
second object. Keil found that three year-olds could
understand that the essence of the object remained unchanged
in these simple costume changes, but that two year-olds could
not. with older children (five to nine year-olds) he used
the deeper transformations that a plastic surgeon can perform
in his stories of change. As stated above, the five year
olds could not understand that the essence of the object
remained unchanged after the surgery, but the nine year-olds
could. So costume changes seem to be understood very early
as not truly representing identity changes, but the changes
provided by sugeons take more age and experience to
understand. These stages in children's theories of animals
and plants, as shown in the studies of the concepts of alive




Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) provide an explanation for
how such a conceptual change might occur. According to their
view, we come into the world with very simple theories about
very broad categories, such as animate vs. non-animate motion
(Spelke, Phillips & woodward, 1995). Gopnik and Meltzoff
also propose that we are endowed with a drive to explain the
world by using the simplest theory that will be able to
predict our environment. According to this model, a cycle of
conceptual change is started when counterevidence is
encountered. At first, counterevidence is ignored as noisy
data. Later, an auxiliary hypothesis may be added to cover
some of these examples. Finally, as the preponderance of
evidence against the theory builds, the theory can be changed
to replace the old one.
The changes in peoples' intuitive theories might also be
similar to scientific theory development throughout history.
From the vantage point of history, we can see that the
development of a new theory to replace the old might not be
automatic. Even when the auxiliary hypotheses are becoming
more numerous and cumbersome, no person may have the insight
to develop a new theory. Also, not everyone who is
introduced to a new theory may accept it. Scientists
disagreed with Copernicus for many years after he developed
the theory of a heliocentric universe to replace the unwieldy
notion of crystal spheres. This old hypothesis had many
exceptions and an increasingly complex set of auxiliary
14
hypotheses (in the form of spheres around spheres...) (Kuhn,
1962). Fortunately, we do not have to replicate the genius
of insight in every new generation, while historical theory
change might be slow in acceptance, conceptual theory change
can occur rapidly as a child (or adult) sees that their
current intuitive theory is inadequate and finds a
replacement theory by learning from various other sources
provided by society and experience (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
Conceptual change would probably most often occur at a sub-
conscious level; just as theories are not often conscious,
their change in status would probably not be as well.
How can we measure changes in a theory, when theories
are constructs, possibly even subconscious, within the mind?
One indirect way was used effectively by Keil (1989) in his
transformations study. Keil simply measured whether the
participants believed the object changed, or believed that it
had stayed the same. The older children responded
differently to the transformations of natural kinds than to
the transformations of artifacts. According to the view of
the Theory Theory, this could be due to changes in their
theory of biology. The younger children treated all the
objects as equally transformed. This confirmed that
children's understanding of the transformations had changed,
but did not illuminate how they changed.
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Despite the fact that theories are usually operating at
an intuitive level, it may be possible to question the
participants directly about their theories, while they might
not be able to place the entire theory into words, they may
be able to offer a richer source of information about their
theories than their responses to the transformations would
show, in the course of Keil's experimental interview, the
children gave numerous justifications for, and elaborations
on, their answers. Keil briefly mentions that, when
confronted with artifact transformations, older children
tended to refer to function more than appearance.
Unfortunately, no further analysis was done with this rich
source of information. Therefore, one of the main goals of
the current experiment is to do an a analysis of the
justifications that participants provide for their answers.
Asking the participants to justify their answers should
offer more insight into their theories of natural kinds and
artifacts. Categorizing their justifications into separate
types of reasoning may also show that perticipants who
mention biological concepts in their justifications might
show a more mature pattern of responding to Keil's
transformation scenarios. The indirect (transformation
answers) and more direct (justification) measures of the
children's theories should validate each other.
16
The Nature of ^^t-.heories"
AS stated above, the Theory Theory postulates that
intuitive theories are the second level of explanation behind
a concept. Until this point, I have been relatively vague
about the specific information or mechanisms that a theory
might include, in fact, the study of the structure and
mechanism of theories has not progressed very far, but from
the writings of Murphy and Medin (1985), Carey (1985) and
those of others (Keil, 1989; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Marcus,
1997, in press) we can begin to examine the structure and
function of theories. Some of the proposed features of a
theory include abstractness
, causality, coherence and rules.
Abstractness implies that the theory is at a more
removed, abstract level than the features or exemplars in the
categories. Although both features and theories are
necessary for complete categorization, the theory is separate
from the features (Keil 1994). An illustration of the
abstract nature of theories can be seen in categories without
graded membership, like odd number (Armstrong, et. al.,
1983). The Family Resemblance models did not separate graded
membership between categories from graded structure within a
category. Since, as illustrated above, the category "odd
number" has fixed membership and graded structure, membership
and structure must be separate functions, at least for some
categories. A theory operating at a removed, more abstract
17
level, can remain separate from the concrete feature
calculation and override these calculations in the cases of
categories with fixed membership.
Intra-concept coherence is the "glue" that holds a
particular concept together (Murphy & Medin, 1985). it is
how the individual parts of a theory behind a category are
related to each other. For example, it can explain how the
theory is related to the data, in the case of the graded
structure of the category "odd number", and how the theory
remains separate from the data in the graded membership of
the same category. Inter-concept coherence tells us how a
particular category is related to other categories within a
larger domain of knowledge (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
"Animal" is a superordinate category, and the category
"monkey" is part of "animal". This coherence also tells us
that toy monkeys and clouds are not related in the same
fashion.
Finally, because we cannot observe all the relevant
properties of an object during every individual observation
of that object, we need some kind of inference mechanism is
needed to make predictions about new items that we place in
our category (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). Just because a tiger
is not currently eating, does not mean that it is not a
acting as a carnivore at other times. Inferring that this
tiger is a carnivore, like the other tigers we have witnessed
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eating, gives us much more information to help us act wisely
around tigers. Inference can also bring information from the
superordinate level of categories to the basic level. For
example, knowing that members of the category of animals
(e.g. tigers, geese) bear offspring, we can attribute the
ability to produce offspring to a new animal species called a
hoatzin, without having to observe a hoatzin giving birth.
These examples present a type of inference consistent
with previous models of categorization. This type of
inference involves generalizing a feature from known examples
of a category to new ones. The only difference between the
two examples is the size of the category within which the
generalization is being made, in the first instance, we are
generalizing the feature "is carnivorous" to a specific
example of a tiger within the category of tigers. In the
second, we are generalizing the feature "bears offspring" to
a new species of animal, hoatzin, within the larger category
of animals. Models of categorization before the Theory
Theory are able to make these inferences, since they involve
features already familiar to the models. The models only
need to pull up the features associated with a category, and
then generalize the features to the specific example. Since
these models are entirely feature-based, they can easily
apply the known features to the new instances.
19
There is, however, another type of inference that these
models cannot account for (Marcus, in press). This inference
involves new features (e.g. bears hoatzin offspring), not
just generic, known features (e.g. bears offspring), while
it may seem obvious that people can infer that a hoatzin has
hoatzin babies, two important types of models cannot predict
this ability. The first type of models that cannot account
for generalization of new features includes feature-based
models of categorization. To illustrate, we turn again to
the case of transformations.
If we know that horses remain horses and have horse
offspring despite being painted to look like zebras, we
should also know that hoatzins remain hoatzins and have
hoatzin offspring despite being altered to look like geese.
Based on the fact that feature-based models are built
entirely out of stored memory representations, Marcus (1997)
has argued that these models cannot infer a new feature.
"... you can't remember that geesabs [a novel animal] have
geesab offspring: you have to infer it." (Marcus 1997, p. 6,
emphasis original) Feature-based models are very efficient
at weighing new examples against the other members in a
category, and making a judgment on whether, and how well, the
new example fits the category. They can also, after
including the new example as a member of the category,
generalize the known properties from the other instances of
the category to the new instance. They cannot, however.
20
infer new features (e.g. a new type of offspring) to new
examples (e.g. a new species) based on their category
membership.
A second class of models that cannot predict that a new
instance of a category will have an appropriate new feature,
includes feed-forward neural network models (e.g. Rumelhart &
Todd, 1993). These neural networks consist of several layers
of nodes: Input nodes, output nodes, and one or more layers
of hidden nodes. These networks start with all the
connections between the nodes randomly assigned a weight, or
strength of connection between two nodes. The network then
receives an input, which is usually an exemplar that contains
several features which are represented as a distributed
pattern of activation of the input nodes. For example, an
hoatzin bird might be input to the system by activating nodes
that represent "has wings," "has claws on its wings," "can
climb trees," and so on, but not activating other nodes that
represent "has gills," or "is made of cloth." The network
then produces output by activating one or more of the output
nodes, and is informed if the output was correct. Based on
the feedback that the output was correct or incorrect, the
system adjusts the weights of the connections between the
nodes so that the network will be more or less likely to
produce that output on the next trial. After numerous
experiences with examples which contain features that
represent every input and output node, the network is able to
21
correctly weigh the connections between the nodes and produce
the correct output for a particular input.
Such a network cannot capture the hoatzin example.
Imagine that a network has been assigned the task of
determining which kind of offspring a particular animal would
have. The input nodes might be the features of the parent
animal, and the output nodes could be types of offspring.
This network would have received many examples of animals and
their offspring, which then would become familiar to the
system. One example might be to input the features of a cat
(claws, fur, etc.) and then the system would select an output
node that represented the offspring, if the system was
incorrect, the weights would be readjusted, and the next time
the system received the cat features as input, it would be
more likely to activate the "kitten" node, it would not,
however, have experienced instances that involve a particular
output node, "hoatzin baby." Since the system was told that
activating the "hoatzin baby" node was incorrect in all of
the thousands of previous examples, the connection leading to
this node would have a acquired a set of connection weights
such that it tends not to be activated. Before receiving the
novel hoatzin input, no given input would activate this
unfamiliar output node; the network would need many examples
of the hoatzin to be familiarized with the novel input and
output to then readjust the connections enough to produce the
novel output. Therefore, these models are incapable of
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producing an output that involves an unfamiliar node (Marcus,
in press)
.
What type of mechanism is able to capture the hoatzin
example, then? The ability to generalize new features to new
instances of a category requires a variable-manipulating
mechanism (Marcus, in press). This mechanism might use a
rule, such as "For all x, Y, such that X is a member of
species Y, X has offspring of type Y." m this case, x would
be a specific instance (Mary) of the unfamiliar species Y
(hoatzin). So since Mary is a member of the hoatzin species,
Mary will have offspring of the type hoatzin. This rule will
not only work when Mary looks like a hoatzin, but also in the
more complex example where Mary has been altered to look like
a goose. As long as Mary is still included in the category
of hoatzins, the above rule will predict that Mary will have
hoatzin babies. The use of variables in the rule allows for
the generation of novel features based on the pattern
established by the other examples of the category.
While the categorization and neural network models
described above may be unable to solve a problem that would
involve producing novel output, models that can represent
variables will not have this limitation (Marcus, in press).
A model such as the LISA model of analogy (Hummel & Holyoak,
1997) can represent variables and therefore could solve the
problem posed in the current experiment. Any model of
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categorization that does not include a variable
representation system will be unable to make inferences
requiring novel responses.
Therefore, l will test if people use variable
representations within an inference system, by testing
whether or not they infer new properties to unfamiliar
objects, i. e. specifically inferring that hoatzins have
hoatzin babies (Marcus, 1997). i expect that participants
can treat both novel and familiar items equally, and can
predict that hoatzins, altered to look like geese, can have
hoatzin babies. If these predictions are borne out, the
results found here would provide exceptionally clear evidence
that a rule or variable-manipulating system is being used.
This thesis will show that children and adults can indeed
make these inferences, and therefore argues that models of
categorization must include some kind of inference mechanism
to be able to accurately portray our ability to categorize
the world. Unlike other models of categorization, the Theory
Theory could easily incorporate this mechanism in the
structure of theories, thereby offering a more complete model
of categorization than has previously been shown.
The Experiment
This experiment utilizes transformation experiments on
natural objects and artifacts (after Keil, 1989) as a
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valuable tool for examining the theory of natural kinds. The
first goal of this thesis, therefore, is a simple replication
of Keil's (1989) experiment, in this experiment, children
and adults were tested using a procedure very similar to
Keil's (1989) plastic surgery transformations of natural
kinds and artifacts, as has been described above, i hope to
again show that as children grow older, they have a better
understanding of the stability of a natural kind through a
superficial transformation
The second goal of this experiment is to categorize
people's types of reasoning during the process of giving an
answer. The justifications given by younger children should
reflect reasoning based on surface features, or as Keil
described them, "characteristic features." As children grow
older, their justifications are expected to reflect their
increasing understanding of the difference between natural
kinds and artifacts by including biological explanations.
The final goal of the experiment is to begin to examine
the structure of theories. Previous research has shown that
children can attribute novel properties to known animals
(Carey, 1985), and known properties to novel categories based
on the category label (Davidson & Gelman, 1990). These
studies cannot tell us, however, how inference within a
category takes place. We will ask children to generalize two
known properties to new natural kind objects: natural kinds
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do not Change when only perceptually altered; and a natural
kind object will produce offspring of the same species as
itself. Testing participants on novel objects will assess
their ability to generalize variable properties from a
familiar instance to a new instance within a domain, if
participants can make these inferences, especially in regard
to the heredity questions, these results would be best
explained by a rule or variable system, similar to the one






Participants included 30 children (15 seven year-olds
and 15 ten year-olds) whose names were drawn from the birth
records for Hampshire County held by the Department of
Psychology at the University of Massachusetts. The average
ages of the two age groups were seven years, two months, and
ten years, two months. These ages were chosen to correspond
roughly to Keil's (1989) groups of second graders (mean age
seven years, six months) and fourth graders (mean age nine
years, nine months). The 15 adult participants were
volunteers from psychology classes at the University of
Massachusetts. Adult participants received course credit for
their participation.
Interview Procedure
Each session was held in a small lab room at the
University of Massachusetts with the interviewer, the
participant, and, if the participant was a child, his or her
parent(s) present. The interviewer was an undergraduate
psychology student at the University who received research
credit for her assistance. The interviewer first explained
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the task to each participant. Adult participants signed
consent forms, as did the parents of the participating
children. The interviewer also asked each child's oral
consent to participate, she then explained to the
participant that he or she would be looking at a series of
objects that would be transformed by a group of plastic
surgeons. The interviewer finally proceeded with twelve
story-question scenarios. These twelve scenarios were
presented in a single, randomized order to the first half of
the participants and in the reverse order to the second half.
Each story-question scenario proceeded as follows: The
interviewer presented the first picture in the pair to the
participant and verbally labeled the object, if the object
in the picture was novel, the interviewer explained a little
about the object, she then explained how the object was
transformed by the plastic surgeons, and presented the
picture of the transformed object (the second picture in the
pair). Finally, with both pictures on the table before the
participant, the interviewer asked the participant a series
of questions to assess the participant's understanding of the
transformed object. These questions, which resulted in four
different scores (described below under scoring), were always
of the same type, but had minor variations in wording to
maintain the participants' interest in the questions.
Humorous, extraneous questions (e.g. "Do you think it would
like to watch TV?") were added to put the children at ease
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with the interviewer. These questions tended to elicit a
smile, and also allowed the child to answer an easy question
and avoid any frustration, a novel item example is given
below; the complete stories and questions are found in
Appendix A.
This is a Soursop. it's a fruit that grows in
the Caribbean, a bunch of islands south of Florida.
It is big, and has a rough skin, it has lots of
little black seeds inside, and tastes a little
sour. We, in America, make lemonade out of sour
tasting lemons and water and sugar, and they make
drinks out of the soursop that way, too. They also
make ice cream out of the soursop by adding milk,
vanilla, water and sugar.
The doctors took the soursop, and sucked all
the insides out, so the skin shriveled up and got a
little darker. They bleached the seeds so they
were white, and they took most of the sour taste
out of the fruit by soaking it in water for a long
time. Then, they put everything back in, but the
skin had shrunk, so they could only get half of the
insides back in. it wasn't so round anymore. When
they were all done it looked like this.
1) So now that the doctors are all done, and it
looks like this, what kind of plant is it? A
cucumber or a Soursop?
2) Uh huh, why do you think that?
3) Do you think it would like to sing?
4) If you took the seeds, and planted them, what would
grow? A Soursop plant or a cucumber plant?
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stimuli
The objects presented to the participants were color
pictures printed on 8 1/2" x 11" white paper. There were
three types of picture pairs used in the story-question
scenarios: familiar natural kinds, novel natural kinds, and
artifacts. The list of pictures is found in Table 1.
Table 1. Pairs of stimuli used, grouped by object type.
Type of Object Pair Original Transformed
Obi ect Ob j ect












The pictures for familiar objects (natural and artifact)
were taken from a commercially available clip-art package,
and altered to insure the pictures within each pair were of
approximately the same size and orientation. Three of the
four pairs of familiar natural kinds (horse - zebra, raccoon
- skunk, tiger - lion) were taken from Keil (1989). All
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references to altering the behavior of the animals were
removed from Keil's scripts for these pairs. The fourth pair
(potato - apple) was an inanimate natural object, and was
included to help reduce the variance in the number of
transformations performed on the objects, it replaced
another example from Keil, in which a grapefruit was
transformed to an orange in only two "steps" or actions
performed by the plastic surgeons. The grapefruit was
injected with sugar, and then it was dyed orange, it was
possible that these two simple steps might make it more
believable that the object had not changed, compared with the
four steps in the tazier - koala script. Keil's grapefruit -
orange pair was replaced by the potato - apple pair, allowing
every pair in this experiment to be transformed in three to
five verbal "steps."
Keil's (1989) original artifact pairs were also not used
in this study because of limitations in the available
artv/ork. Keil's artifact pairs (e.g. coffeepot - bird
feeder) were hand-drawn illustrations; the artist could
ensure that the first and last object looked similar. The
available clip-art pictures showed large differences in the
shapes of the two objects. As a consequence, Keil's artifact
pairs would have been much more visually different from each
other than the natural item pairs. To reduce this
difference, other artifacts were selected so that (as judged
by the author) the pictures within a pair had approximately
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the same perceptual similarity as the pairs of novel and
familiar natural kinds.
Creating novel items from a given clip-art database
presented a unique challenge, especially since adults and
school-age children are familiar with many animals. The
novel natural items were originally mythical-looking animals
created with a computer by assembling a collage of parts from
other clip-art objects, when these pictures were presented
to a child in pilot testing, his or her first reaction was
"That's not real!" Children may not have been including the
unrealistic novel animal in their category of animals, and if
so, would have no reason to generalize their knowledge from
familiar animals to such unnatural stimuli.
To avoid the children's rejection of the objects as part
of their categories of animals and plants, the novel natural
kinds used in the experiment were selected because they were
real but obscure items, and probably unfamiliar to the
participants. The soursop is a rare island fruit, and its
picture was found in a Caribbean cookbook (Sookia, 1994).
The guitarfish, a member of the stingray family, was
photographed for a Caribbean reef fish identification book
(Humann, 1989) The tarsier^ (which was inadvertently
^ This animal was presented to all subjects as a tazier. At the
end of the experiment, an error was discovered in copying the material
from the source book, resulting in the mislabeling of the object. For
the sake of consistency with the experimental materials, this animal
will be referred to as a tazier within this thesis.
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mislabeled in the scripts as a tazier) and hoatzin were found
in a educational book on life found in jungles (Richards,
1970). The tarsier is a small animal, similar to a bush
baby, that lives in the trees of tropical rain forests, and
the hoatzin is a bird that inhabits the canopy of the rain
forest. Stimuli for these novel objects were generated by
using a computer drawing program to alter clip art pictures
so they would closely match the photographs of the actual
objects. Post-test questioning in piloting assured us that
the children believed the obscure plant and animals were
real, and that the children were indeed unfamiliar with the
objects. Half-size, black and white copies of all pictures
are reprinted in Appendix B.
The novel items were not transformed into different
novel natural kinds, to parallel the other transformations
for familiar natural kinds and artifacts. Instead, novel
natural items were transformed into familiar natural items.
This pairing hopefully constituted the strongest test of the
participant's theory of the identity of the novel animals.
Participants should know much more about the familiar object
than the novel object. If the participants were biased to
respond on the basis of familiarity with the object, they
could be expected to have the most difficulty saying the
object was still really the first, unfamiliar object.
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Suqqestibil ity
in the process of designing a script format,
interviewers found it easy to lead a participant to the
"correct" answer, especially when the participant was a
child. This issue touches on the suggestibility of children,
which has been investigated in psychology and has
implications for child witnesses in our legal system. Ceci
and Bruck (1993) reviewed eighteen studies of suggestibility
and found that preschool children (even up to age six) are
the most susceptible to suggestion, but that suggestion can
also bias answers from older children to a smaller extent.
Also, children will occasionally lie when they are motivated
to do so. This fact has serious implications for the current
study. If children could be properly motivated to lie about
something they knew, it might be much easier to influence
their answer for a question about which they were unsure.
Another area of concern was that our interviewer was
unfamiliar to the children, and that fact might further
motivate the children's suggestibility. Goodman and her
colleagues (Goodman, et. al. 1995) investigated familiarity
and bias as two factors that could influence recall. Four
year-olds participated in play with a research assistant, and
were then interviewed about the play session. They were
interviewed by either their own mothers or by another mother.
Also, half of the interviewers were told biased assumptions
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about the play session prior to the interview. They found
that, especially during a free interview, children made the
most errors in recall when questioned by a biased, unfamiliar
interviewer. The children's own mothers elicited the best
recall, regardless of their bias. Biased interviewers also
questioned misinformation given by the children more
strongly, and were less accurate in describing what they
believed to have occurred during the play session.
Since half of our children were only slightly older than
pre-school age, and they would be interviewed by an
unfamiliar assistant, several steps were taken to minimize
the possibility of suggestibility in the questioning: The
interviewer was blind to the hypotheses of the experiment and
was instructed not to try to help the child in any way.
Also, the interviewer was given a strict script to follow.
She was only allowed to add (a) Uh-huh's or OK's to make sure
the child knew the experimenter was still interested, and (b)
restatements of portions of the script to answer children's
questions about the transformations. Finally, the same
number of questions were asked during the natural and
artifact transformation scenarios.
In contrast to these precautions, Keil's (1989)
interview format was open-ended and run by an assistant
familiar with the hypotheses of the experiment. Also, in the
few transcripts provided as examples, interviews during
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natural object scenarios tended to be longer than interviews
about artifact scenarios. These differences may have caused
children to reevaluate their answers more often for natural
items than for artifacts, leading them, in effect, to the
"correct" answer. Despite these large differences in the
interview format, we predicted that Keil's findings would
still be present in an unbiased setting.
Scoring
Initial Judgment Score
Assistants scored the first statement given by the child
in response to "What kind of is it, a or a ?"
In accordance with Keil's (1989) scoring procedure, a score
of 1 meant that the child believed the object to be changed.
Scores of 3 meant that she believed the object to remain
essentially unchanged on the inside. Scores of 2 meant she
was wavering, or was genuinely unsure about the current state
of the object. A score of 3 also included all answers of the
sort - "Well, it looks like the transformed animal, but
really is the original animal." Using the soursop - cucumber
pair as an illustration, the answers were coded 1 for when
the response was "cucumber" and 3 for "soursop."
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Final Judgment Snnro
in pilot testing for this experiment, children seemed to
be biased to quickly name the transformed object in response
to "What kind of is it 1" It was possible that their
first answer did not adequately represent their understanding
of the transformed object. Therefore, the entire transcript
of the scenario was examined for changes in the participants'
judgments. Participants often changed their mind in response
to the justification question (described below), a typical
example from an adult was:
E.: What kind of animal is it?
S . : A koala.
E.: Why do you think that?
S.: Well, she looks like a koala, but she's probably a
tazier
.
The final judgment score used the same scale as was used for
the initial judgment score. For illustration, the above
example shows an initial score of 1 (for the changed animal),
but a final score of 3 (for the original animal). The final
judgment score may be more representative of the
participant's understanding of the transformation.
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Offspring Score
A third score, the offspring score, was based on the
response to the question, "What kind of babies will it have?"
Answers here were coded to parallel the scores in the initial
and final judgment scores. A score of 1 was given when the
participant believed the offspring would be the same kind as
the transformed object. A score of 3 was given when he or
she believed the offspring would be like the original object,
and a score of 2 was again for unsure answers. Thus, if a
raccoon was transformed into a skunk, and a participant said
that the animal would now have skunk babies, the score was a
1. If he said the animal would have raccoon babies, the
score was 3.
Justifications
The second question asked of the participants was, "Why
do you think that?" or "Why isn't it a (object in the
pair, not named by the participant)?" The responses can be
considered justifications of their answers to the judgment
question. These justifications were categorized (post-hoc)
into thirteen varieties and then lumped more broadly into
three major explanatory groupings (see Table 2). The groups
of justification types represent three types of reasoning:
perceptual, behavioral /functional, and biological.
38









Lists one or more features.
Cites the perception of the
whole object.




"Because [the zebra] is
black and white."
"Because that looks like a
koala, not a tazier"
"Because horses don't have
stripes .
"








Explains the function for a
particular feature.
Explains their behavior or
reactions
.
" 'Cause they. . .changed
everything .
"
"[It's a mailbox] because
you put things in it... and
those are things you need."






Explains how the animal
would now behave.
One adult used this
comment, difficult to
categorize.
"[It's a goose] because it
doesn't climb trees [like a
hoatzin], it just flies,"
"A horse is in the same
family as a zebra, so it
could be changed."
Looks/Is The object looks like X,
but really is Y.
Final You can change an artifact
easily, but not a natural
object
.
"It's still a guitarfish, it
just looks like a shark."
"It's easier to change a
ball than the internal
structure of an animal to
something else.
Out/In The outside is changed but
the insides remain the same
"It's not a zebra 'cause
[they didn't] change like
anything internal ..."
Parts The parts are the same,
just the configuration is
different
"It's made out of everything
that was in the original
one .
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The perceptual and biological types of reasoning were
identified first, and they parallel the scoring system used
on the judgment scores. The perceptual category, was
hypothesized to closely match Keil's description of the
children's answers to "What is it now?" that resulted in a
score of 1 in his experiment. As stated in the introduction,
Keil believed a score of 1 meant the child was being led by
the characteristic perceptual features. The biological
category was hypothesized to closely match Keil's description
of the children's answers to "what is it now?" that were
scored as a 3. A score of 3 meant (for Keil) that the child
was overriding the features with non-perceptual explanations
or essences.
The behavioral /functional category, evolved from an
examination of the answers that did not fit in the perceptual
or biological categories. These answers refer to properties
not visible in the picture, but are also not as essential to
the objects as biology or DNA.
Participants often did not limit themselves to only one
of the thirteen different varieties of justifications when
responding. The coder recorded every justification that was
given by the participant, but within a transformation
scenario each individual variety was only recorded once. To
illustrate the scoring procedure, consider the following
answer given by a participant: "That's the koala... that's
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what it looks like(a), it's got its ears, small eyes, and
claws(b), and climbs trees(c)." This answer was scored as
having three separate varieties of justification (a = whole
percept, b = features, and c = behavior). The fact that
three separate features were mentioned was not recorded as





Two independent assistants coded 31 (68%) of the 45
participants on the initial judgment, final judgment and
offspring score. The scores given by the two coders agreed
98.0 percent overall, with 98.7% agreement on the initial
score, 97.3% on the offspring score, and 98.0% on the final
score. If any discrepancies occurred in the scoring of these
31 participants, the scores given by the two coders were then
averaged. Just one of the assistants scored the remaining 14
participants. He also was the sole coder for all
justifications
,
A 2 between (order, forward or reverse) by 3 within
(type of object: familiar, novel or artifact) ANOVA was run
on the initial judgment score to test for order of
presentation effects. There was no significant effect of
order (F(l,43) = .58, p = .45) and no significant interaction
(F(2,86) = .44, p= .64) between order of presentation and
the type of items. The same type of ANOVA was run on the
offspring score (there were only two types of objects in this
score: familiar and novel natural kinds). Neither main
effects of order (F(l,43) = .16, p = .69) nor interactions
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with item type (F(1,43) = 1.8, p = .19) were significant.
Since there were no order of presentation effects, the data
for the two different orders of presentation were combined
for all subsequent analyses.
Initial Judgment Scnrta
The mean initial judgment scores for seven year-olds,
ten year-olds, and adults are depicted in Figure 1. On their
initial judgments, the youngest children treated all items
nearly identically. Their mean familiar natural kinds score
(hereafter, fam) , mean novel natural kinds score (hereafter,
nov), and mean artifacts score (hereafter, art) were all 1.0.
The ten year-olds' responses reflected more variability in
responding, where their fam was 1.35 and nov was 1.27, but
art remained near one (1.02). The data from adults was
similar to the date from ten year-olds. Fam and nov were 1.6
and 1.5, but art was again 1.0. This data shows an
increasing separation, as a function of age, in the scores of






7 Y. 0. 1 0 Y. 0. Adult
Figure 1. Initial judgment score. This score represents the
first answer given to "What is it now?" 1 = judgment that
the object has changed, 2 = indecision in judgment, and 3 =
judgment that the object is still the same as before the
transformation
.
A 3 between (age) by 2 within (type: familiar or
artifact) ANOVA was run on the initial judgment score. The
main effect of the type of object presented was significant
(F(l,42) = 13.61, p = .0006). The main effect for age was
not significant (F(2,42) = 3.18, p = .05), but this analysis
includes the performance on artifact items, which did not
change with age. There was a significant interaction of kind
and age (F(2,42) = 3.51, p = .04). This interaction
replicates Keil's (1989) finding that younger children
respond similarly to the two types of objects, and that older
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children's and adults' responses show a differentiation
between the types of objects.
A second analysis of the initial judgment score was
carried out to test whether the participants were treating
familiar and novel natural kinds similarly. A 3 between
(age) by 2 within (type, familiar or novel) ANOVA found a
significant increase in the scores due to age (F(2,42) =
3.77, p = .03). Although the mean score for familiar natural
items was higher than for the novel natural items this
difference fell just short of significance (F(l,42) = 3.66, p
= .062). There was no interaction effect of novelty with age
(F(2,42) = .25, p = .77). The lack of a novelty main effect
is probably due to a restriction in the range of scores,
since this experiment most of the scores were I's, and the
means are very low. it is also possible that no real
differences exist between the performance on the novel and
familiar natural items.
Final Judgment Score
The analysis of the final judgment score presented
another challenge. All of the participants finally decided
that all artifact items had changed; there was no variation
in all 180 scores. Due to this obvious floor effect (or
ceiling effect, since the lowest score is the expected
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answer), there was no variance on which to base an ANOVA that
included the artifact items.
The data from the initial and final judgment scores
present the same picture. The youngest group did not respond
differentially to the three item types as can be seen in
Figure 2 (fam was 1.02, nov was 1.02, art was 1.00). in
contrast, older participants again differentiated between
natural objects and artifacts. Ten year-olds showed small
differences between their natural (fam = 1.35, nov 1.33) and
artifact (art = 1.00) scores, while the differences were
larger in the adult group (fam = 1.78, nov = 1.68, art =
1.00)
.
The similarity between the initial and final judgment
scores is evident in the number of transformation scenarios
where subjects changed their minds. To calculate this, the
number of questions that received different scores for the
initial and final judgments were counted. If a subject's
responses were coded by two assistants, each coder's scores
were calculated separately and then averaged. Seven year-
olds received different initial and final judgment scores
only 2 times (out of a possible 180) or 1.1 percent of the
time. Ten year-olds received different scores 5 times, or
2.8 %, and adults 9.5 times, or 5.3 %. Most of the data from
adults resulted from one participant who consistently (seven
times) replied that the natural object really had changed,
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but when replying to the offspring question stated that it
was still really the first object. Even including this one
participant, subjects only changed their minds 3.1 percent of

















-O— Novel Natural Kinds
-—Familiar Natural Kinds
tA— Artifacts
7Y. 0. TOY. 0. Adult
Figure 2. Final judgment score. The final score re-codes
the participant's judgment, accounting for any changes in the
participants ' answers
.
A 3 between (age) by 2 within (type: familiar or novel)
showed a main effect of age (F(2,42) = 5.31, p = .009) and no
effects for novelty (F(l,42) = 1.71, p= .20) or interactions
with novelty and age. (F(2,42) = 1.71, p = .19). These
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results are consistent with those found in the initial
judgment score. The novelty effect was not even marginally
significant here, however. Participants did not treat the
novel and familiar natural objects differently.
Offspring Score
The offspring scores are found in the familiar and novel
natural kinds scenarios only. Figure 3 shows that the mean
for both types of items increased as a function of age. This
increase was also found for familiar and novel natural items
in the initial and final judgment scores. However, the
offspring question produced higher scores overall than the
previous two scores. Seven year-olds were again the lowest
scorers, but their mean responses were not near one for the
first time ( fam = 1.48, nov = 1.45). Adults scored higher,
as expected ( fam = 2.27, nov = 2.14). Ten year-old children
scored between these two, but it is also interesting that
their novel scenario mean (1.79) is higher than their
familiar scenario mean (1.73). This is different from the
previous two (initial and final judgment) scores, where all























7 Y. 0. 1 0 Y. 0. Adult
Figure 3. Offspring score. This score represents answers to
"What kind of babies will it have?" 1 = the baby was judged
to be the same kind as the changed object, 2 = the
participant was unsure, 3 = the baby was judged to be the
same kind as the original object.
A 3 between (age) by 2 within (type: familiar or novel)
ANOVA showed a nearly significant effect of age (F(2,42) =
3.01, p = .06). The fact that responses to the offspring
question did not significantly increase as a function of age
was unexpected. It is possible, however, that participants
of all ages better understand the biology involved in
procreation, increasing scores at all age levels for this
question.
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As in the initial and final judgment scores, there was
no interaction effect for novelty and age (F(2,42) = 2.36, p
= .11). However, unlike the initial score, a main effect for
novelty fell far short of significance (F(l,42) = .30, p =
.59). The lack of an effect for novelty replicates the
findings from the final judgment score analysis.
Furthermore, as stated above, the novel score was higher than
the familiar score for the ten year-olds. The fact that
these two scores could change their ordinal relationship to
each other further suggests that there are no overall effects
of novelty, even accounting for the restricted range of
scores found in this experiment. Participants used
information from their knowledge of familiar natural items on
nearly all the novel items.
Justifications
Frequency Count
Three analyses were carried out on the justifications
participants had provided for their responses to the
transformation scenarios. First, a simple tabulation of the
frequencies of the justifications, as a function of age, is
given in Table 3. Older participants might have been
expected to give more varied answers because of their greater
verbal skills. However, the total number of different
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varieties of justifications did not vary with age. Both the
seven and ten year-olds gave a total of 210 different
justifications in the experiment, and adults gave only
slightly more (220).
Table 3. Simple frequency count of all justifications given,summed over trial type.
Perceptual Seven Y. 0. Ten Y. 0. Adults Sub-totals
Features 127 113 68 J wo
Whole 38 25 50 1 1 1
Definition 3 2 0
X X O
5
Told 0 0 1 1
Perceptual 168 140 119 427
Sub-Totals
Funct . /Behav. Seven Y. 0. Ten Y. 0. Adults Sub-Totals
Transform 35 34 41 110
Function 3 7 10 20
Subj ' s Behave 3 3 0 6
Behave 0 2 3 5
Family 0 0 1 1
Funct . /Behav. 41 46 55 142
Sub-Totals
Biological Seven Y. 0. Ten Y. 0. Adults Sub-Totals
Looks /Is 1 13 28 42
Final 0 8 5 13
Out /In 0 2 9 11
Parts 0 1 4 5
Biological 1 24 46 71
Sub-Totals
All Types GRAND
Sub-Totals 210 210 220 TOTAL 640
Individual Justification Type Analyses
To further analyze the justifications, the data had to
be transformed since a participant often responded with more
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than one type of justification within one transformation
scenario. To eliminate problems with having different
numbers of answers per question, the justifications were
collapsed so that each subject was given perceptual scores,
functional /behavioral scores, and biological scores. Each
score was calculated in the following manner. A participant
scored one "point" for each transformation scenario where he
or she had provided a justification from that type. These
"points" were summed within each transformation scenario type
(familiar, novel and artifact). This summing resulted in
three scores that ranged from zero to four. An example from
the familiar natural kinds will illustrate this data
consolidation. One child answered with both features
(perceptual) and transformation (functional/ behavioral)
justifications on one question, just the transformation
(functional/ behavioral) justification on a second scenario
and the looks/is (biological) justification on the final two
scenarios. Thus the participant's responses resulted in a
perceptual score of 1, a functional /behavioral score of 2 and
a biological score of 2 for the familiar natural kinds.
Perceptual scores, as illustrated in Figure 4, did not
seem to vary as a function of the type of scenario. These
scores were the types of justifications that encoded
perceptual information, and perception was equally accessible
for all objects. They did, however, slightly decrease as a
function of age. For example, familiar natural kinds
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averaged 3.4 questions answered with a perceptual
justification for seven year-olds, 3.1 questions for ten
year-olds, and 2.3 questions for adults. A 3 between (age)
by 3 within (type of scenario) ANOVA showed only a
















-O— Novel Natural Kinds
-D— Famliar Natural Kinds
-A— Artifacts
7 Y. 0. 10 Y. 0. Adult
Figure 4. Perceptual justifications score. Each score was
the number of scenarios where participants gave perceptual
types of justifications. Maximum score = 4 in each category.
As can be seen in Figure 5, functional /behavioral scores
showed a very different pattern than the perceptual scores.
There was no obvious age trend for the natural kinds of
items. The mean for familiar natural kinds answered with
functional or behavioral justifications, for example, was 0.6
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questions in seven year-olds, 0.8 questions for ten year-
olds, and 0.67 for adults. Artifacts, on the other hand, do
show an increasing age trend, where the seven year olds' mean
was 1.13, and the adults' mean was 1.93. A 3 X 3 ANOVA found
that the only significant effect was the main effect for type




















-0— Novel Natural Kinds
-D— Familiar Natural Kinds
-A— Artifacts
7 Y. 0. 10 Y. 0. Adult
Figure 5. Functional and behavioral justifications score
Each score was the number of scenarios where participants
gave functional or behavioral types of justifications.
Maximum score = 4 in each category.
Biological justifications would be less relevant to the
artifact scenarios than the natural kinds scenarios, and they
seem to be the most mature level of explanation. All means
for biological scores are illustrated in Figure 6. There
was, as in the initial and final judgment scores, an
54
increasing separation between artifact and natural scores as
a function of age. Seven year-olds answered no familiar
natural kinds or artifacts questions with biological types of
justifications and only averaged 0.07 questions on novel
natural kinds. The mean for adults, on the other hand, was
0.27 artifacts questions answered with biological
justifications, and 1.27 and 1.33 questions on novel and
familiar natural scenarios, respectively. Again, a 3 x 3
ANOVA was carried out on the biological scores. Unlike the
perceptual and functional /behavioral scores, all effects were
significant: main effect of age (F(2,42) = 9.807, p = .031),
main effect of scenario type (F(2,84) = 12.418, p < .0005)




7 Y. 0. 1 0 Y. 0. Adult
Figure 6. Biological justifications score. Each score was
the number of scenarios where participants gave biological
types of justifications. Maximum score = 4 in each category.
Each of the justifications scores reveals a story
consistent with the data found in the judgment scores.
Perceptual justifications simply decrease as a function of
age. They are available to participants of all ages and are
also the most common types found in all ages. However, these
justifications decline in frequency with age and are replaced
with functional justifications for artifacts and biological
justifications for both types of natural items.
Functional /behavioral scores are indeed valid as a
separate designation, especially in the artifact scenarios.
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While the mean judgment scores on artifact scenarios remain
stable as a function of age, the functional /behavioral
justifications in these scenarios become more frequent with
age. The functional/behavioral justifications seem to
provide a richer source of information by which to analyze
the data from the artifact scenarios. The fact that older
participants responded more frequently with these functional
justifications may indicate that functional justifications
represent a higher level of reasoning than the perceptual
justifications used by younger participants.
Biological justifications mirror the initial and final
judgment scores. Biological reasoning on natural items is
more frequent in older participants for both the familiar and
novel kinds, but not for the artifact scenarios. This high
degree of similarity is to be expected, since the biological
justifications category was designed to mirror the examples
given by the participants in Keil's experiment who received
scores of three. In both the judgment scores and the
justifications, more biological reasoning gives higher
scores
.
Correlating Justifications and Judgments
A final analysis of the justification scores verifies
that the perceptual and biological justifications correspond
to judgment scores of one and three, as they were designed to
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do. Four Pearson R correlations compared participants'
scores on the initial and final judgments with the number of
natural item questions answered with perceptual or biological
justifications
.
Participants' initial judgment score and their
perceptual justifications score showed a strong negative
correlation (r = -.89). a strong negative correlation was
also found between the final judgments and perceptual scores
(-.93). These correlations could also be seen as a strong
positive correlation between the participants' likelihood of
choosing the transformed animal as what it is now, and the
number of perceptual justifications they gave.
The correlations between the biological justifications
score and the judgment scores show the opposite pattern, as
expected. Initial judgments correlated highly positively
with biological scores (r = .95) as did final judgment scores
(r = .94). These positive correlations mean that if
participants chose the original animal in their judgments,
they were extremely likely to give biological justifications
for their answers.
The previous correlations were highly predictable, but
comparing the justification scores with offspring scores
provides an interesting and unexpected picture. Figure 7
graphically represents the data for correlation between
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perceptual justifications score and offspring score (each
diamond may represent more than one data point). The
correlation between the perceptual scores and offspring
scores is not as strong, but is in the same direction as the
correlations with the judgment scores (r = -.66). Figure 7
shows that the reason for the reduction in the strength of
the correlation is that there are data points located in the














Figure 7 . Relationship between perceptual justifications and
offspring scores. If a diamond represents more than one data
point, the number of data points it represents is given
immediately to the right of the diamond.
The correlation between biological scores and offspring
scores is again not as strong as, but in the same direction
as, the correlation with the judgment scores (r = .66).
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Figure 8 shows this positive correlation, and again the
points may represent more than one item in the data. The
reason for the smaller strength of this correlation is very
different, it stems from the fact that the number of
biological justifications given by participants was very low,
and therefore most of the data is clustered in the bottom
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bi ol ogi cal j usti f i cati ons
Figure 8. Relationship between biological justifications and
offspring scores. If a diamond represents more than one data
point, the number of data points it represents is given to
the right of the diamond.
When comparing these two graphs, it seems that
participants were able to correctly answer the offspring
question while still giving perceptual justifications for
their judgments of the current identity of the object. The
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reverse was not true for the biological justifications, if a
participant could use biological justifications for his
answers, he would then be able to come up with the correct
answer for the offspring question.
A few subjects seemed to be in an intermediate stage of
understanding about the implications of these
transformations. Three seven- year-olds, one ten-year-old,
and four adults consistently answered with the changed animal
for judgment questions and with the original animal for
offspring questions, while other participants echoed this
trend less consistently. The eight participants who
consistently answered in this pattern also gave high levels
of perceptual justifications. Their mean combined natural
items perceptual score was 6.6, and four of these
participants gave perceptual justifications in all eight
natural scenarios. In contrast, the mean for the number of
natural scenarios answered with biological justifications for
these eight was less than one. These participants, along
with others who showed this trend to a lesser degree, make up
the outlying data points in Figure 7, while not straying from




AS Stated earlier, there were three goals to this
thesis. The first was to replicate Keil's (1989)
transformation study. The second was to show that examining
justifications can more effectively measure the types of
intuitive theories people might use in categorization. The
final goal was to show that children and adults can
generalize what they know from other objects within a
category to make inferences about what variable properties a
new member of the category might have.
Replication of Keil (1989)
The first goal was only partially met. Keil's basic
pattern of findings was replicated. Younger children treated
artifacts and natural kinds equally, and older children and
adults started to differentiate their answers based on this
category difference. The main limitation in this replication
of Keil's work is that Keil's mean scores were much higher
than the ones reported here. The means Keil reported have
been estimated from his graphs and placed in Table 4 . As a
comparison, Keil's fourth graders' mean score on natural
kinds was about 2.8, but the ten year-olds in the present
study had mean scores of only 1.35. This large difference in
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mean scores does not, however, eliminate the replication of
the effects originally found by Keil.
study
^' ^""""^^ estimated from Keil's (1989) transformations
Grade (Mean Age) Biological Kinds Mean Artifacts Mean
Kindergarten (5:8) 1.75 1.4
Second Grade (7:6) 2.5 1.2
Fourth Grade (9:9) 2.8 1.3
What could cause this large difference in the range of
scores between this study and Keil's? One explanation lies
in the fact that maintaining genetic heritage despite
perceptual transformation may be a more suitable measure of
biological understanding than maintaining identity. The
scores obtained in this experiment for the offspring question
are more similar to those reported by Keil. Keil also
reports that "several kindergartners , though ultimately
deciding that kind membership was changed, were nonetheless
troubled that the transformed animals had babies of the
original kind of animal . ... They therefore may have had
some inkling that the type of baby matters, but not enough to
override the salient characteristic features." (Keil, 1989)
The offspring question seems much more valid and pivotal in
understanding biological essences.
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The individual data from participants in this study also
support the offspring question as a better measure of
biological understanding. As stated earlier, at least eight
participants believed that a transformed animal could be one
kind of object and have a baby of the other kind. These
participants seemed to have no hesitation in generating these
conflicting answers. Their theory of transformations and
biology allowed both of these answers simultaneously.
Another possibility for the difference in responses
between this study and Keil's original experiment, is that
Keil's experiment had a flexible interview format, with
numerous challenges to the children's thinking. The
interviewers asked not only, "What is it now?" and, "Why do
you say that?" but also asked "Even though" questions that
further challenged their thinking. Beyond even that, the
interviewer frequently told the children directly what kind
of babies an animal would have, and what kind of parents it
had. Our study left the question of offspring for the
participants to answer.
In pilot testing for the current experiment, a more
flexible interview format was used. This interview was
similar to Keil's; there were more challenges to the
children's thinking, and the interviewer was possibly biased
to influence the responses, since she was the author. There
is no direct evidence of bias, however. The many different
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methods attempted in piloting make it difficult to directly
compare the pilot data with the current data. However, the
single judgment score was in general higher than the means
obtained in the current experiment for the initial and final
judgment scores, since most of the items were the same in
the pilot and actual experiments, these differences in
interview format seem the likely cause for any differences
between the means reported in this thesis and those reported
by Keil.
What in the format difference might have contributed to
the differences between the responses in the two experiments?
I believe that differences in interview format had two
effects. First of all, Keil's free-form, challenging
interview forced the participants to think deeply about the
question during the interview. No simple answer went
unchallenged, and the participants had to more fully explain
their understanding of the transformation. Secondly, the
free-form interview format and the informed interviewer may
possibly have led the participants to give the expected
pattern of responses. By not allowing participants to rest
on any simple answer, the challenging interview format may
have led the participants to believe that their first answer
was false and that they should reexamine and consider a
change in their answer. Also, biased interviewers can lead
children to inaccurate recall of experienced events (Goodman,
et. al., 1995).
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The next procedural step is to try to encourage deep
contemplation of the questions while still insuring that the
experimenter is not leading the participants to the right
answer. There are several possible methods that might
produce these ideal conditions . The interviewer might have
the children listen to a puppet make mistakes in answering
the questions, and then judge whether or not the puppet was
correct. The children would first be informed that the
puppet is from the moon and is often wrong about earth
questions. This procedure has been used successfully by
linguists who have found that younger children can correct
puppets who are making mistakes that they themselves had
produced in a language elicitation task (Hiramatsu & Lillo-
Martin, 1998).
Another possible method (which might be more appropriate
for the older children and adults) is to try to challenge the
participants to think deeply about their answers within a
fixed script format. This challenge could be accomplished by
designing a set of follow-up questions that are arranged in a
tree-diagram. Each response could then be specifically
challenged with a "even though..." question. For example, in
the raccoon to skunk scenario, if the participant responded
that the object was a skunk, the experimenter could reply,
"So, even though the animal used to be brown with black
stripes on its tail, you think it is a skunk?" Or, if they
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responded that it was still a raccoon, the reply could be,
"So, even though the animal now smells like a skunk, you
still think it's a raccoon?" This method seems to be the
most likely to challenge subjects of all ages to deeply
consider their answers, and yet it still retains the unbiased
structure of a strict script format.
Analysis of Justifications
The second goal of the experiment met with success, in
accordance with their design, the perceptual justifications
corresponded to the response that the animal had changed
during the transformation, and the biological justifications
corresponded to the opposite response. The justification
scores and the judgment scores are certainly not independent,
and should not be. The importance of these types of
justifications lies in the fact that it can show a more
complete picture of the participants ' intuitive theory of
natural kinds and objects. As stated in the introduction,
Keil mentions that functional justifications seem to be more
evident at later ages for artifacts, but he stops his
analysis there. The current experiment successfully
replicated that brief comment with a full analysis.
Justification levels also produced a more complete
picture of the participants who answered that the object was
changed, but the offspring wouldn't be. The fact that these
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participants usually used perceptual justifications
reinforces the idea that they are in an intermediate level of
understanding concerning these transformations.
Inference Within Cateaorips using RuI^r or Variables
In regard to the third goal, there were several possible
outcomes for the subject's responses to the novel objects.
The first outcome is that no participant would be able to
generalize what she know about natural kinds to the new
natural objects. This outcome, of course, is not what we
would predict based on intuition. However, all models of
categorization before the Theory Theory would predict this
outcome. As stated earlier, Marcus (1997; in press) has
argued that these models have no mechanism for dealing with
inferring new properties (hoatzin babies) to new objects
(hoatzins) within known categories (animals).
The second possible outcome is that all participants
would treat the novel exactly the same as the familiar.
There would then be no differences in their answers to
familiar and novel natural objects. Once children and adults
have included the object into a category, they would be able
to generalize properties to all members of the category
equally. This outcome would show that the inference
mechanism for the theory of a category was something similar
to a rule. The children would just substitute one
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instantiation of a variable (or exemplar of a category) for
another in the rule (Marcus, 1997).
The evidence from this experiment would seem to support
the second possibility. There were large differences between
the older participants' responses to novel items and the
artifacts, but no significant differences were found between
the novel and familiar natural kind items on any of the
measures. The only possible problem with this evidence is
the restriction in the range of answers, if the range were
larger, would the small difference between novel and familiar
on the initial judgment score have been significant? The
replications proposed above would hopefully remove any doubt
about this question. I predict, however, that even with
larger ranges of responses there will be no significant
effect of novelty. This prediction is based partly on the
fact that the differences between familiar and novel
scenarios were not nearly significant on many measures, and
partly on the fact that the means had switched ordinal
position as the highest average for the ten year-olds on the
offspring question.
This thesis shows that the ability to infer novel
properties to novel examples of known categories is not
developing, at least within the age range tested. All
participants scored approximately equally on the novel and
familiar natural items, since there were no age by novelty
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interactions on any of the measures, if the information was
available to the participants, they used it equally well on
the novel items, regardless of age.
Thus it seems that Keil's experiment, with a few
modifications, was able to shed new light on the structure of
the theories behind categories like natural kinds. Since all
participants, children and adults alike, generalize novel
properties to novel animals, they are probably using some
variant of a rule system. Also, the Theory Theory, unlike
any of the early models of categorization, can incorporate
such a rule system into it's current model of categorization.
To account for children's and adults' ability to generalize
variable properties to novel items, the structure for the
Theory Theory, or any future models of categorization, must




presented in this appendix according to type of
?n^?h^ SJnf; 5^"^^^ ^^^^^ correspond to placementi t e order of forward presentation.
Preamble
For adult participants only
This experiment is designed for seven and ten year old
children. We are testing adults on the same concepts.
Please take the questions relatively seriously, even though
they may seem a little simplistic to an adult.
For all participants
What we're going to do today is, I'm going to show you some
pictures, and tell you some stories about them, and then ask
you some questions. OK?
The stories are all about a group of very good doctors who
perform special operations. Have you ever heard of
operations called plastic surgery? That's where a doctor can
change how a person's face looks so they look like someone
totally different ... well, that's the kind of operations
these doctors are going to do. They are going to change the
way things look.
Familiar Natural Objects
Horse - Zebra - 2
The doctors took a horse and did an operation that dyed
black and white stripes all over its body. They braided its
tail, and they operated on its mane to make it stiffer, so it
would stand up like the bristles of a toothbrush. When they
were all done, the animal looked just like this.
1) When the doctors were finished, what kind of animal was
it? Was it a horse or a zebra?
2) OK, why isn't it a ?
3) What kind of babies do you think it would have? Would it
have zebra or horse babies?
4 ) Do you think it would like to live in a bathtub?
Potato - Apple - 3
The doctors took a potato and did surgery that took the
eyes (those black spots) from the outside, and put them in
middle in the inside. They polished the outside until it was
shiny and smooth. They dyed the outside red. They gave it
shots of sugar to make it sweeter. Finally they pushed a
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stem into the top, and when they pushed it in, the top andbottom were dented. Now it looks like this.
1) What is it now, is it a potato or an apDle?
2) Why isn't it a ?
^"""^ ""^^^^ ^^^"9 planted it in the ground,what would grow, an apple tree or a potato plant?
4) Do you think it would make a good baseball?
Tiger - Lion - 7
The doctors took a tiger, like this, and bleached his
fur so that the black stripes went away and the orange parts
looked yellow. Then they gave him a lot of thick hair around
his head, and a little puff of fur at the end of his tail.
When the doctors were done, he looked like this.
1) Now, when the doctors were all done, and the animal looks
like this, what kind of animal is he? is he a tiger or a
lion?
2) OK, why isn't he a ?
3) Do you think he would like to sleep in your bed?
4) If he had babies, what kind of babies would they be?
Lions or tigers?
Raccoon - Skunk - 8
The doctors took a raccoon and shaved away some of its
fur. They put the extra fur on its tail so it was big and
fluffy. They dyed the fur all black. Then they bleached a
single stripe all white down the center of its back. Then,
with surgery, they put in its body a sac of super smelly
odor. When they were all done the animal looked like this.
1) After the operation, what kind of an animal was it? A
skunk or a raccoon?
2) OK, why do you think that?
3) Do you think it would like to watch TV?
4) If it had babies, what kind of babies would it have?
Raccoons or Skunks?
Novel Natural Objects
Tazier - Koala - 1
This is a tazier (TAH-ZEER). She lives in the trees in
tropical rain forests. She has long thin fingers to get a
good grip on the tree branches when she climbs. She is also
nocturnal, which means that she sleep during the day, and
comes out to eat bugs at night. Her big eyes help her see
well in the dark.
The doctors took the tazier and made her eyes smaller.
They gave her claws instead of those skinny fingers. They
also did surgery to make her body thicker and furrier.
Finally, they dyed her fur gray. Now she looks like this.
1) Now that the operation is all done, and she looks like
this, what kind of animal is she? Is she a koala or a
tazier?
2) OK, why do you think that?
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ILil^.l^^
babies, what kind of animal would they be?Wou d they be taziers or koalas? ^
4) DO you think she could play the guitar now?
Guitarfish - Shark - 5
r^r-ihHofn ^^rt
?^ftarfish. It lives in the ocean near the
^ H K^^""*
^"^^^^ fl^t on the bottom of the oceanand hide its mouth is on the bottom of its head, so i? eatsscraps of food left on the sea floor
like TtrfJnn?!^ ^^H^
the fish, and made its head narrow, nota triangle. They made its mouth bigger, and gave it a
^7 Mo.?.^^r^;K ""J?^" ''^^y "'^^^ it looked like this.1) N w that the doctors are all done, and the fish looks
9t T,.^ ""^^^ u"-""? ^^^^
i^ ^ ^ guitarfish?
2) Why do you think that?
3) Do you think it would tell funny jokes?
4) What kind of babies would it have, guitarfish or sharks?
Soursop - Cucumber - 6
This is a Soursop. it's a fruit that grows in the
Caribbean, which is a bunch of islands south of Florida, it
is big, and has a rough skin, it has lots of little black
seeds inside, and tastes a little sour. We, in America make
lemonade out of sour tasting lemons and water and sugar, and
they make drinks out of the soursop that way, too. They also
make ice cream out of the soursop by adding milk, vanilla,
water and sugar.
The doctors took the soursop, and sucked all the insides
out, so the skin shriveled up and got a little darker. They
bleached the seeds so they were white, and they took most of
the sour taste out of the fruit by soaking it in water for a
long time. Then, they tried to put everything back in, but
the skin had shrunk so they could only get half of the
insides back in. It wasn't so round anymore, when they were
all done it looked like this.
1) So now that the doctors are all done, and it looks like
this, what kind of plant is it? a cucumber or a Soursop?
2) Uh huh, why do you think that?
3) Do you think it would like to sing?
4) If you took the seeds, and planted them, what would grow?
A Soursop plant or a cucumber plant?
Hoatzin - Goose - 11
This is a special bird that lives in the jungle of
Guatemala. It's called a Hoatzin (WAT-ZEEN) . When it is
young, it has extra claws on its wings and uses all four sets
of claws to climb trees. When it is older, like this one,
the claws fall off, but it still uses its wings to climb
trees like arms.
The doctors took the hoatzin, and dyed its belly white.
They gave it a longer neck, and a long, skinny head and beak.
Then they gave it webbed feet instead of claw feet. Finally,
they made its tail shorter. Now it looks like this.
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2) How do you know that?
Hoatz^ns?''^''''
°' '"^''^^^ ^^^"^ ^ill have? Geese or
4) Do you think it would like to dance?
Artifacts
Key - Coin - 4
it wafso'^hnr^h.^T^ ^
^^^y^ like this, and heated it untilI s so hot that they could mold it into a circle. Then
l^^
''^''''^^ ^ machine that pressed the
ttJ: fv. ""^^^
^"^^ P^^""®^ "^^t^l that had pictures on themWhen the circle came out, it looked like this.
TIvoTA-^^^">,^^^.'^°^^°^^
""^^^ the stuff looks
ot ^''f ' u^^^ ^^"""^ ^hi^g is it? a coin or a key?Z) Uh huh, how do you know that?
3) Do you think it would be heavy?
4) Could you break it in half?
Soccer Ball - Bowling Ball - 9
The doctors took a soccer ball that looked like this.They painted it all black, and cut three little holes in it.
Then, they filled it with some really dense plastic, so it
was really heavy. When the doctors were done, it looked like
this
.
1) So now that the doctors are all done, and it looks like
this, what kind of ball is it? A bowling ball or a soccer
ball?
2) Uh huh, how do you know that?
3) Would it still be able to roll down a hill?
4) Could you plug it in and listen to the radio?
Umbrella - Flag - 10
The doctors took an umbrella, like this, and they took
the cloth parts off. They cut up the cloth, and re-sewed it
to look like a rectangle. Then they dyed the rectangle in
three big stripes of red, yellow and blue. Then they bent
the metal handle so it was a straight pole. They used the
extra metal from the spines of the umbrella to attach the
cloth to the pole. When they were done with the operation,
it looked like this.
1) When they were finished, what kind of thing was it? was it
an umbrella or a flag?
2) OK, why isn't it a ?
3) Do you think it will taste good?
4 ) Do you think it looks like a flag of a country?
Trash can - Mailbox - 12
The doctors took a trash can that looked like this.
They slit it down the side, and took some of the metal out so
it would go straight up, not flare out at the top. They
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pounded the can flat on three sides, and left one sidecurved. They took the extra metal and made a lid for the
n^?;i-^H^-L ^i^^ ^? P""^ °" ^i^^ of the can. They
?htn^ 1 ? ^^^y ^^^^ they put thet i g on top of a tall piece of wood, so that it looked like
1) When the doctors were done, what kind of thing did theyhave? A trash can or a mailbox?
2) OK, why do you think that?
3) Do you think it could feel sad?
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